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Deep Critique and Democratic 
Lawyering in Clinical Practice 
Sameer M. Ashar* 
The crisis in legal education has been defined and accentuated by 
urgent and existential critiques. This body of complaint and suggestion—in the 
form of books, foundation reports, law review articles, major media entries, 
and blog posts—has two gaping holes that this Essay seeks to fill. First, the 
critiques fail to attend to the diminishing of social justice values and 
commitments in legal education in the period leading up to the 2008 recession, 
especially as clinical education—often designated as the carrier of justice 
values in law schools—faced generational shifts and law schools extended 
“practical” education to more students. Second, with the exception of the work 
of Robin West, there is little in the way of a forward-looking, progressive, and 
justice-oriented response to the crisis of legal education. The reform discourse 
since the 2008 recession is composed almost exclusively of proposals, such as 
those by William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha, undergirded by neoliberal 
assumptions and constructs. Leading reformers accept the accelerated 
disaggregation and commodification of legal practice without attention to 
aspects of the profession that privilege the public good over market norms and 
rationales. This Essay draws on clinical practice rooted in pedagogies focused 
on the development of critical analysis and political engagement to make the 
case for a progressive vision of law school reform—and, more generally, the 
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legal profession—that emphasizes justice, connection, and cogeneration by 
lawyers and communities of approaches to entrenched social problems. 
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This near-universal and indeed near-militant avoidance of the concept 
of justice in the very educational institutions that should centralize its 
study . . . is so indefensible (and so rarely defended) as to be fairly 
labeled pathological. 
       ––Robin L. West1 
 
“Skills training,” clinical legal education, “experiential learning”—all 
these are but the tips of an iceberg representing deeper disputes over 
the aims of legal education, the roles of lawyers in a changing, 
transnationalizing society and a destabilization of employment and 
long-term security. The task of reforming legal education, thus 
regarded, becomes an exercise in reflection upon the nature of legal 





 1. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 27 (2014). 
 2. Peer Zumbansen, What Lies Before, Behind and Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on 
Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal Education, in STATELESS LAW: EVOLVING 
BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE 215, 221 (Helge Dedek & Shauna Van Praagh eds., 2015) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Calls for change in legal education have evolved in the last decade. 
Earlier critiques, mainly focused on the disconnection between schooling and 
practice, were tough and pointed but with limited effect. As the bottom has 
fallen out of the markets for legal employment and law school admissions, the 
criticism has become urgent and existential. This body of complaint and 
suggestion—in the form of books, foundation reports, law review articles, 
major media entries, and blog posts—has two gaping holes that this Essay 
seeks to fill. First, the critiques fail to attend to the diminishing of social justice 
values and commitments in legal education in the period leading up to the 2008 
recession, especially as clinical education—often designated as the carrier of 
justice values in law schools—faced generational shifts and law schools 
extended “practical” education to more students. Second, with the exception of 
the work of Robin West, there is little in the way of a forward-looking, 
progressive, and justice-oriented response to the crisis of legal education. The 
legal education reform discourse since the 2008 recession is composed almost 
exclusively of proposals undergirded by neoliberal assumptions and 
constructs.3 This Essay draws on clinical practice to make the case for law 
school reforms that emphasize justice, connection, and the cogeneration by 
lawyers and communities of approaches to entrenched social problems. 
The focus of my initial thinking in this area responds to the 
mainstreaming of experiential legal education around the publication of 
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Practice of Law by the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 2007.4 The challenge has been 
to defend the social justice imperative embedded in clinical legal education, as 
deans and faculties have expanded practical skills training in response to the 
“professionalism crisis.”5 The founders and initial funders of modern clinical 
education possessed an underlying social and political vision alongside a skills 
agenda,6 which created openings for clinicians and students to engage in 
innovative and important social justice work at law schools across the country. 
Generational shifts within U.S. clinical education7 create uncertainty about how 
to nurture and preserve this underlying social and political vision.8 Leading 
 
 3. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of “neoliberal” precepts. 
 4. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
 5. See WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7–10. 
 6. See Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 (2001). 
 7. See Praveen Kosuri, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: X Marks the 
Spot, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 205, 213–17 (2010). 
 8. “The struggle to preserve the social justice origins of legal clinics will be the defining 
challenge of the twenty-first century for clinical legal education. Faced with pressures to assimilate to 
the general curriculum, standardize programs, measure learning outcomes, cater to students’ short-
term career interests, and palliate government resistance both domestic and foreign, clinicians 
increasingly will be forced to justify their existence in student-centered terms that can obscure the 
mission of serving needy clients and communities.” Rachel Moran, Transformation and Training in 
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figures in legal education have sought to flatten American Bar Association 
(ABA) accreditation standards, alter assumptions regarding faculty 
employment security, and accentuate skills training.9 In such an environment, 
will relatively low-cost externships and apprenticeships replace clinics with a 
social justice mission? Legal services and public defender offices will continue 
to suffer in an era of government austerity.10 As public interest law shrinks, 
how will clinics respond? Will clinics have the resources necessary to replace 
the loss of funded legal representation for the poor? Will there be pressure to 
forego broader social change advocacy in exchange for individual client 
services? 
As law schools seek to integrate experiential education across the 
curriculum, it is essential to consider how the transfer of skills and doctrine 
might take priority over, and thus diminish, the social justice imperative.11 
These shifts suggest that those who wish to preserve clinical education as a 
space for social justice work must excavate the pedagogical value underlying 
such work. Law students will continue to represent individual poor clients. 
Individual representation falls within the access to justice norms of the legal 
profession and comports with the skills agenda advanced by the Carnegie 
Foundation and other observers reacting in part to the downsizing of the legal 
market.12 But the social change component of working with groups of poor 
clients will be most vulnerable as we endure the resistances and pressures noted 
above. This is the first gap in the discourse on U.S. legal education that I 
address in this Essay. 
While the disconnection with practice and the economic crisis in legal 
education has received widespread attention, a longstanding existential crisis 
(in Robin West’s terms)—the consistent sidelining of justice within law 
schools and the lack of underlying theories of lawyering—is rarely discussed or 
 
the Law: Serving Clinical Education’s Two Masters, AALS NEWS, May 2009, at 1, 18, 
http://www.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/april2009newsletter.pdf [http://perma.cc/NE65-
FDZZ]. 
 9. See, e.g., David Yellen, Loosening the ABA’s Grip on Law Schools, FAC. LOUNGE (Feb. 
21, 2013), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/02/loosening-the-abas-reins-on-law-schools.html 
[http://perma.cc/48XV-JFRQ]. 
 10. See generally, e.g., Tyler Kasperek Somes, The Legal Services NYC Strike: Neoliberalism, 
Austerity and Resistance, 71 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 8 (2014). 
 11. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009) 
(“Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of neutrality and scientific 
technique, and individualist norms of liberal legalism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism 
severed from difference-based identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to 
both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in claims of neutral lawyer 
judgment, technical ‘lawyering’ process values, and client-centered representation indifferent to the 
other-regarding interests of community building.”). However, it is important to understand that the 
social justice imperative and skills transfer are not inherently oppositional. Focus on complex social 
problems facilitates the transfer of high-level lawyering skills. See infra Part IV.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Mark Yates, The Carnegie Effect: Elevating Practical Training over Liberal 
Education in Curricular Reform, 17 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 233, 245–48 (2011). 
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confronted.13 This constitutes the second gap in the discourse since the advent 
of the economic crisis in U.S. legal education. The most well-known reform 
proposals, by legal scholars such as William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha, 
are shaped by neoliberal assumptions and constructs.14 Indeed, the responses to 
these proposals largely draw on these same assumptions and constructs.15 In 
this Essay I aim to push at the bounds of the discourse on legal education 
reform, to open space for more “social” responses to the crises facing law 
schools, and to raise a thread of clinical practice as a model and guidepost for 
legal education. 
In addition to confronting resistances and pressures within clinical 
education, it is essential—in this period of crisis for legal education—for legal 
academics to set forth a progressive vision of legal education linking expansive 
social vision with pedagogical goals. I seek to articulate a new set of 
aspirations for legal education: a vision of law schools that defend community 
and solidarity against the effects of concentrated wealth and subordination 
along multiple dimensions of identity, status, and power; a vision of law 
schools that confront the structural changes in the market for legal services and 
originate new modalities of legal practice. The neoliberal reformers of U.S. 
legal education appear to ignore the dialectical relationship between law 
schools and the legal profession. The proposals assume a one-way relationship 
in which disaggregated and commodified legal functions must lead to a 
restructuring of legal education and the law school curriculum.16 This partial 
understanding is dangerous. When the profession has lost its moorings under an 
onslaught of economic forces, law schools have the opportunity, if not the 
responsibility, to make interventions that emphasize non-market, justice values. 
Clinical practice with expansive social vision is one such intervention in 
the profession and in the market, and can be a core generator of new visions for 
legal practice. To serve in this role, clinics must be embedded in an ecosystem 
of legal and non-legal actors, organizations, and networks. Clinics, because 
they are the primary sites of actual practice in legal education, can make law 
schools central nodes in these networks. In short, this Essay argues that we 
need to further the moves from insular, extractive legal education toward 
connected, cogenerative learning and practice centers. Moving from extraction 
to cogeneration expands the pedagogical repertoire of new vision law schools 
 
 13. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 22–30; Heidi Boghosian, The 
Amorality of Legal Andragogy, 3 STAN. AGORA 1 (2002), 
http://agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume2/articles/boghosian/boghosian.pdf [http://perma.cc/LVZ2-
J2UG]. 
 14. See infra Part I.C for discussion of these proposals. 
 15. See generally, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014) (finding that the present value of a law degree typically 
exceeds its cost for most law school graduates). 
 16. See infra Part I.C for discussion of these proposals. 
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and makes them more relevant in the evolving worlds of both private and 
public sector practice. 
Part I begins by focusing on the forces—both internal and external—
buffeting clinical legal education at this point in its modern history. It then 
considers major legal education reform proposals in this period of law school 
crisis and the background ideologies and commitments shaping those 
proposals. In Part II, I describe two problem areas on which we are currently 
working in the UC Irvine Immigrant Rights Clinic: mandatory immigration 
detention and conditions of work for low-wage immigrant workers in the 
warehouse industry. Part 0 describes two bases of knowledge that we aim to 
excavate from our focus on those problem areas: “deep critique” and 
“democratic lawyering.” Finally, in Part 0, I outline the opportunities and 
constraints within legal education for a progressive reform vision.  
The economic crisis in legal education may compel us to accept the 
profession as it is now: transitory, disaggregated, outsourced, and 
commodified. Visionary reform will build on the core public values of the legal 
profession and recognize that our students need to be flexible and 
experimentalist problem solvers, working through complex issues in 
collaboration with clients and communities. Clinical practice that teaches 
critical systemic thinking and democratic lawyering has the potential to be an 
engine of renewal and reform. 
I. 
RESISTANCES AND PRESSURES 
Disaggregating legal functions and undervaluing professional judgment 
threaten broad social vision for law schools in a rare period of ferment and 
reform. Duncan Kennedy argued that “[s]ocial justice is everywhere [in legal 
education], but it’s disintegrated and politicized under pluralist rules that 
require some of everything to be there, so that the school can maintain its 
reputation as a representative law faculty and avoid being treated as 
marginal.”17 It would be wise for law school faculty and administrators to look 
beyond the established pedagogical canon and individual student training, to 
refrain from viewing students as passive consumers of legal information, and to 
work to reform donor interests. However, as I briefly set out below, there are 
obstacles both within and outside clinical legal education that may foreclose 
generative reform. 
A. Path Dependency 
An earlier vision of social change lawyering materialized in the 1970s, 
during the development of a network of federally funded legal services offices 
 
 17. Duncan Kennedy, The Social Justice Element in Legal Education in the United States, 1 
UNBOUND 93, 103 (2005). 
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with “back-up” centers in particular areas of the law.18 Legal services attorneys 
aspired to provide excellent representation in select areas in which poor clients 
faced difficulty, including benefits, housing, and family law,19 often with the 
government as an adversary in judicial and administrative forums. There were 
competing emphases as federally funded legal services expanded, including  
(1) strategic litigation developed from large caseloads; (2) experiments in the 
holistic socio-legal provision of services, with lawyers collaborating with social 
workers and psychologists; and/or (3) development of a paradigm of service 
provision centered in individual casework and client engagement in 
neighborhood legal services offices.20 These features were at least partly a 
consequence of critiques of public interest law as practiced up to that point. 
The War on Poverty and the Great Society embodied an emphasis on localism 
distinct from the more centralized New Deal anti-poverty programs.21 Within 
public interest law, Derrick Bell challenged the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(NAACP LDF) on the ground that the much-lauded LDF campaign 
culminating in Brown v. Board of Education was lawyer-led and relatively 
unaccountable to affected communities.22 
Like any dynamic field in which programs face internal and external 
political pressures, the localist legal services paradigm itself came under 
criticism by progressive scholars beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s.23 The 
progressive critique had its roots in critical legal studies. Rick Abel argued that 
emphasizing legalism in local anti-poverty advocacy was at best ineffectual, 
and at worst a reinforcement of entrenched power relations in society.24 Lucie 
White illustrated her profound discomfort with the narrowness of legal process 
and legal remedies in traditional poverty law practice.25 Gerald Lopez proposed 
a literal rearrangement of the interior of legal services offices, and his work has 
 
 18. See Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor—A Commentary, 
83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1682–83 (1995). 
 19. See Rebecca Sharpless, More than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in 
Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 351 (2012). 
 20. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 32–34 (1993). 
 21. See Thomas J. Sugrue, All Politics Is Local: The Persistence of Localism in Twentieth-
Century America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
HISTORY 301, 301–26 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003). 
 22. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 23. There was also a sustained conservative attack on legal services that gained strength during 
the Reagan Administration and continues to this day. See Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: 
Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 761–71 (2002). 
 24. See generally Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced 
Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474 (1985). 
 25. See generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday 
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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encouraged many law students to blur the lines between law, organizing, and 
social work in their practice.26 
The progressive critique significantly altered public interest practice. 
Those law students most influenced by those works moved into public interest 
practice in the 1990s and 2000s. They were largely outside the localist legal 
services infrastructure, portions of which were withering due to defunding and 
federal restrictions on advocacy. A small group of organizations and law school 
clinics, as well as a few reinvigorated legal services offices, advanced the latest 
iterations of social change lawyering. Private entities are now more prominent 
adversaries of public interest lawyers, and diminished government agencies 
undertake limited intervention on behalf of indigent clients in private ordering. 
Public interest lawyers practice in a broader range of areas, from foreclosure to 
education, to workers’ rights, to environmental advocacy. The practice is more 
global as lawyers face multi-national employers and financial institutions, 
represent individuals and organizations with cross-border ties, and use human 
rights law and forums to fight poverty and marginalization within the United 
States.27 Public interest law finds itself in a very different environment, with 
new adversaries across a range of subject areas. The open question is whether 
path-dependent legal education, including law school clinics, has kept up with 
changes in the field. 
B. External Discipline and Austerity 
When law school clinics have attempted to move away from providing 
individual legal services or describing a more expansive social mission for 
themselves, commentators within the field have been critical on pedagogical 
grounds or have expressed discomfort with the possible incongruity with 
students’ political commitments.28 In addition to the self-generated 
compunctions regarding the “imposition” of faculty political commitments on 
students, there are the more obvious external pressures that governments place 
on clinics to prevent challenges to powerful corporate interests with which they 
are allied.29 Other commentators have argued that clinicians increasingly evade 
their responsibility to abide by a “service” model of legal advocacy and lean 
 
 26. GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE 
LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
 27. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 
DUKE L.J. 891 (2008). 
 28. See, e.g., Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical 
Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 337–38, 342 (2012); April Land, “Lawyering 
Beyond” Without Leaving Individual Clients Behind, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 47, 54–59 (2011); Stephen 
F. Reed, Clinical Legal Education at a Generational Crossroads: A Self-Focused Self-Study of Self, 17 
CLINICAL L. REV. 243, 249–52 (2010). 
 29. See generally Robert R. Kuehn & Bridget M. McCormack, Lessons from Forty Years of 
Interference in Law School Clinics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2011). 
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toward “issue” advocacy because they seek elevated faculty status.30 Finally, 
commentators have objected to clinics with an expansive social vision of 
human rights by relying on an inherent and zero-sum dichotomy between 
politics and pedagogy.31 
Path dependency and an aversion to educators explicitly invoking political 
commitments undergird these critical, disciplinary interventions in clinical 
legal education. In this way, the modern neoliberal critics’ views about clinics 
with an expansive social vision coincide with those of both path-dependent 
clinicians, focused nearly exclusively on economically triaged individual legal 
services, and the original conservative critics of the Legal Services 
Corporation. The possibility suggested in the post-Carnegie era—one of low-
cost externships and apprenticeships replacing in-house and live client clinics 
undertaking complex politicized work—has increased as the economic crisis 
has unfolded. Further, the austerity regime of a shrinking government sector 
has hit legal services and public defender offices hard, as those offices grapple 
with increasing economic and social inequality, and has thus strengthened the 
call for service clinics.32 Both the economic crisis within U.S. legal education 
and the austerity regime, stemming from the same macroeconomic forces 
unleashed by infirmities in the financial sector, have come together to threaten 
visions of clinical education extending beyond service to individual indigent 
clients or future private sector employers. 
C. Neoliberal Reform 
Neoliberal assumptions and constructs operate on the broader field of 
legal education reform as well. “Neoliberalism” is a contested term used 
sparingly in the legal academic literature. Like David Singh Grewal and 
Jedediah Purdy, I believe that the term has strong explanatory power and thus 
use it in multiple contexts in this Essay. Grewal and Purdy define neoliberalism 
by referring to the following cluster of features: 
 
 30. Margaret Drew & Andrew P. Morriss, Clinical Legal Education & Access to Justice: 
Conflicts, Interests, & Evolution, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE FOR AMERICANS 
OF AVERAGE MEANS (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14) 
(“Our conclusion from this brief review of the development of clinical legal education is that 
clinicians’ search for equivalent status and/or rents within the academy played an important role in the 
shift to diversify away from the service clinic model.”). This analysis of clinician motives is strikingly 
devoid of supporting evidence. 
 31. Eric A. Posner, The Human-Rights Charade, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Peace-LoveGrandstanding/149961 [http://perma.cc/2ZAX-AV2H] (“An 
argument could be made that political advocacy has pedagogical value. That is possible. But if the goal 
is political, the pedagogical value is secondary, and likely to be compromised.”). But see Sital 
Kalantry, Eric Posner Has a Narrow Understanding of Human-Rights Clinics, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Nov. 24, 2014), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2014/11/24/eric-posner-doesnt-
understand-human-rights [http://perma.cc/TVQ7-5MDM]. 
 32. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 175 (2012) (“If understaffed legal services 
offices were offered the full-time assistance of the third-year class of local law schools, that would 
help fill unmet needs while the students get useful training.”). 
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Neoliberalism, like classical liberalism before it, is also associated 
with a kind of ideological expansionism, in which market-modeled 
concepts of efficiency and autonomy shape policy, doctrine, and other 
discourses of legitimacy outside of traditionally “economic” areas. . . . 
Neoliberalism, then, takes its meaning from this contest between 
market imperatives and democratic demands; it names a suite of 
arguments, dispositions, presuppositions, ways of framing questions, 
and even visions of social order that get called on to press against 
democratic claims in the service of market imperatives.33 
David Harvey emphasizes the expansive, political nature of the neoliberal 
project.34 In the realm of education specifically, neoliberalism facilitates 
market dominance as the “privileged domain of measuring and regulating 
human worth.”35 Wendy Brown speaks to the foundational changes wrought by 
neoliberal ideas in higher education: “Once about developing intelligent, 
thoughtful elites and reproducing culture, and more recently, enacting a 
principle of equal opportunity and cultivating a broadly educated citizenry, 
higher education now produces human capital, thereby turning classically 
humanist values on their head.”36 
Some have used the current moment of crisis within legal education to 
advocate a reform program that seeks to meet private employers’ demands.37 
Prominent legal academics such as William Henderson and Brian Tamanaha 
have proposed reforms that share features with the market-based approaches 
advocated by the American Law Deans Association38 and the Cato Institute.39 
 
 33. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3–4 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 34. “In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting 
as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs,’ it emphasizes 
the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be 
maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all 
human action into the domain of the market.” DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
3 (2005) (endnote omitted). 
 35. Christopher Breu, The Post-Political Turn: Theory in the Neoliberal Academy, in CAPITAL 
AT THE BRINK: OVERCOMING THE DESTRUCTIVE LEGACIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 241, 242 (Jeffrey R. 
Di Leo & Uppinder Mehan eds., 2014). 
 36. WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 24 
(2015). 
 37. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); 
James E. Moliterno, The Future of Legal Education Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 423 (2013); 
Symposium, The Future of Law, Business, and Legal Education: How to Prepare Students to Meet 
Corporate Needs, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 137 (2013); Casey Hall, How Daniel Katz is Working to Reinvent 
the Law, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013) http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters 
.com/law-and-techology/daniel-katz-working-reinvent-law [http://perma.cc/Y9RJ-HX6M]. 
 38. See, e.g., Pub. Comment on the Application of the Am. Bar Ass’n for Reaffirmation of 
Recognition by the Sec’y of Educ. as a Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agency in the Field of 
Legal Educ., Am. Law Deans Ass’n (undated), http://www.nacua.org/documents/ALDA 
_Comment.pdf [http://perma.cc/AB4K-9VZZ] (arguing that ABA imposes requirements on accredited 
law schools that are not only extrinsic to educational quality but also intrusive on institutional 
autonomy). 
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Henderson argues for a backwards design of legal education based on 
collaborations with leading employers in the restructured market for legal 
services.40 He suggests that both incumbent firms and newly ascendant 
companies created to disaggregate (and outsource) legal functions would help 
law schools retool to produce the legal workers needed in the new economy for 
legal services.41 Tamanaha’s main proposal is to bifurcate legal education, with 
a first tier of research institutions largely in line with the vision of law schools 
embedded in current ABA accreditation rules, and a second tier of schools with 
untenured faculty focusing to a much greater degree on practical skills 
training.42 In place of clinics, which reformers describe as too expensive to 
scale up to cover all students, Tamanaha argues for a shortened law school 
program at the second tier schools with a third year of apprenticeship at private 
and public interest firms.43 
The economic crisis in U.S. legal education has skewed the reform 
discourse toward market-based solutions, with little to no attention paid to the 
profession’s justice imperative, as articulated by West and legal profession 
scholars such as Susan Carle44 and Deborah Rhode.45 Professional norms 
encompass a broader set of values than the market may demand in any given 
moment. Those values are mutually reinforcing; clients seek out lawyers 
because they believe lawyers have competencies and a degree of social power 
in complex systems of governance. That social power relies, at least in part, on 
the idea that lawyers are part of a justice-seeking profession with some 
commitment to the greater good.46 The neoliberal reforms further marginalize 
 
 39. See WALTER OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN 
OVERLAWYERED AMERICA (2011). 
 40. Henderson, supra note 37, at 462–63 (“On the most basic level, it is clear that law schools 
must become more attuned to legal employers—we need professional employment for our graduates 
to keep the doors open. . . . [W]e are making business decisions designed to get our institutions to 
places of safety; we are not making pronouncements of our social, political, or aesthetic values.”). 
 41. Id. To be clear, it is essential that legal educators understand (and interpret) foundational 
changes in the market for legal services, both for the sake of accurate scholarly approaches to the field 
and to adjust pedagogical methods for the employment market that our graduates face. See infra Part 
IV.C. What is troubling is Henderson’s single-minded and over-determined focus on the 
disaggregation and technological change in a portion of the market; his arguments are too narrow to 
apply to U.S. legal education as a whole. 
 42. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 174 (“The law school parallel—in program and pricing—of 
vocational colleges and community colleges will come into existence, many of two-year duration. 
Research-oriented law schools will remain as they are.”). 
 43. Id. at 175; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar 
Eligibility After Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2012) (arguing for 
apprenticeships in place of a third year of law school). 
 44. See Susan D. Carle, Introduction to LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 1–11 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005). 
 45. Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009). 
 46. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of 
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (“Cause lawyers 
thus reconnect law and morality and make tangible the idea that lawyering is a ‘public profession,’ one 
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the public-oriented, justice-seeking elements of legal professional identity and 
undermine the profession as a whole. 
II. 
CENTERING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Rather than design backwards from the perspective of economic actors in 
a portion of the shifting market for legal services, law schools must put large, 
complex social problems at the center of their curricula. This preserves 
essential aspects of the legal profession’s commitment to seek justice, and 
teaches transferable approaches to lawyering in a time of foundational change. 
This Part sets forth two problem areas on which we are focused in the UC 
Irvine Immigrant Rights Clinic.47 Although the work is challenging to 
undertake and to contextualize in the clinical setting, it contains a set of 
generative aspirations for legal education. These two projects contain many of 
the features of the new forms, contexts, and challenges of public interest law as 
described in Part I.A. They both involve powerful private entities (in one case 
due to government outsourcing). The state has a limited and contingent 
protective role in one project and is the prosecutor of our clients in the other. 
Both projects involve multiple areas of law and are driven by global economic 
shifts and migration. Through our intake, we consciously move toward projects 
that evoke the political,48 and this puts our students in varied and multi-faceted 
modes of public interest practice. 
A. Mandatory Immigration Detention 
After running a small pilot project, we assigned nearly every student in 
the clinic to provide limited representation to mandatorily detained immigrants 
in bond hearings at the Adelanto Detention Center, ninety miles northeast of 
 
whose contribution to society goes beyond the aggregation, assembling, and deployment of technical 
skills. In this way lawyers committed to using their professional work as a vehicle to build the good 
society help legitim[ize] the legal profession as a whole.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 47. Although sometimes denigrated by non-clinical colleagues, clinicians often develop and 
deconstruct written case studies from their practice with students to derive pedagogical insight and, 
less frequently, to make interventions in policy, doctrinal, and legal profession debates. Although there 
are strengths and weaknesses to this scholarly approach, reflective analysis of one’s practice has the 
possibility of generating theories of pedagogy and praxis. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative 
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 
170 (1994) (“Reflection must be central to such a clinic’s work because the fundamental goal of the 
clinic itself is to build theory—to increase our practical knowledge about the settings in which we 
work and the methods of lawyering and teaching that we might use. Because building grounded theory 
is the clinic’s fundamental goal, scholarship—descriptive, critical, and prescriptive writing—must be 
an integral part of its work.”). 
 48. See Sameer M. Ashar, Fieldwork and the Political, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION 
OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 288, 288 (Susan Bryant et al. 
eds., 2014) (“The challenge then lies in figuring out how to keep ‘the political’—alternative 
conceptions of society as articulated by those excluded from the established social structure—at the 
surface in clinical legal education.”). 
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Irvine. Students worked on these cases in addition to their primary litigation 
and non-litigation projects largely focused on civil rights and workers’ rights. 
The use of immigration detention by the U.S. government has risen at an 
alarming rate in the last decade. In fiscal year 2014 (FY2014), U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took 425,728 individuals into 
custody.49 The government requested approximately $5 million per day in 
FY2014 to house immigration detainees.50 Although immigration detention is 
civil in nature, detainees experience it as punitive, and conditions can be as 
harsh as those in the criminal system.51 One major contributor to the rise in 
immigration detention was the 1996 enactment of a statute requiring the 
mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted of a wide range of criminal 
offenses, including minor drug offenses.52 Individuals who already have a 
removal order and those considered “[a]rriving aliens” are also subject to 
mandatory detention.53 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld mandatory detention 
by a 5-to-4 vote in Demore v. Kim.54 However, recent U.S. circuit court 
decisions have limited Demore’s holding and the application of mandatory 
detention statutes, finding that due process requires detainees to receive an 
individualized bond hearing.55 Our students represent clients in bond 
proceedings at the six-month mark in their period of detention, in accordance 
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez v. Robbins.56 
The Adelanto facility is operated by the GEO Group, a publicly traded 
corporation.57 The facility is located in a remote part of San Bernardino 
County, east of Los Angeles, in an area called the high desert. Imagine a 
plateau in the middle of mountain ranges, sparsely marked by Joshua trees and 
tall metal towers carrying electrical lines. Subdivisions of suburban homes and 
strip malls sprout up in the high desert along Route 395 with great speed. In 
this area, the detention center is an economic development project. But it is 
 
 49. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-
immigration-removals.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4Y-FGA6]. 
 50. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY 
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES (2013), 
http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-Detention-August-
2013-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5CL-H6XA]. 
 51. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014). 
 52. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 585–87 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)) (amending section 236 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 53. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2014). 
 54. 538 U.S. 510 (2002). 
 55. E.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D. 
566 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 56. See 715 F.3d at 1127. 
 57. Adelanto Detention Facility, GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.com/maps 
/locationdetails/35 [http://perma.cc/G64X-58DN] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
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short-term development.58 Buses with the jolly green GEO logo transport 
young men from jails and prisons in Los Angeles County and Orange County 
to Adelanto each day. That same logo flies on a flag outside of the facility, 
alongside the California State and United States flags. 
Because of Adelanto’s distance from downtown Los Angeles, the lack of 
local development in the proximate area, and the general paucity of legal 
resources for indigent immigrants, few detainees have legal representation or 
the capability to find an attorney through familial and community networks. 
The facility currently holds up to 1,300 men, and plans are underway to add 
another 650 beds, including a women’s housing unit.59 Men in orange 
jumpsuits are made idle by their confinement, behind high metal fences topped 
with barbed wire, far from their families. The facility houses the courtrooms for 
three immigration judges, which seem out of place, except that this appears to 
be an improvement over the use of videoconferencing to beam detainees into 
courtrooms far away in downtown Los Angeles.60 
B. Conditions of Work in the Warehouse Industry 
A second clinic project is both distinct from and significantly related to 
the first. We have been working with the Warehouse Workers Resource Center 
(WWRC) for several years, providing legal information to workers through 
periodic one-day clinics in the Inland Empire region. The foreclosure crisis hit 
the area hard, and it has experienced double-digit unemployment rates since the 
2008 recession. However, 40 percent of imports into the United States flow 
through the Long Beach and Los Angeles ports, and land is cheap in the 
region.61 Real estate developers have built four hundred million square feet of 
warehouse space, fueled partly by the growth of e-commerce.62 One who drives 
through the region on Interstate 15 sees acres and acres of beige boxes 
stretching out in the midst of vast fields, in addition to the requisite 
subdivisions and strip malls.63 (Perhaps not accidentally, the warehouses look 
much like the Adelanto detention facility.) An economist estimated that the 
average wage for non-professional workers in the industry is $22,000 per year, 
 
 58. Economists Arjun Jayadev and Samuel Bowles argue that the growth of the “guard labor” 
sector globally is based on expenditures borne of mistrust and not an especially generative use of 
capital. Arjun Jayadev & Samuel Bowles, Guard Labor, 79 J. DEV. ECON. 328 (2006). 
 59. Kate Linthicum, Expansion of Adelanto Immigrant Detention Center Underway, L.A. 
TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-ff-adelanto-immigration-20140709-
story.html [http://perma.cc/T9DC-35F7]. 
 60. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 61. See Gabriel Thompson, The Workers Who Bring You Black Friday, NATION (Dec. 16, 
2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/177377/holiday-crush [http://perma.cc/4CU6-BQ6R]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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and even less for those who are not direct employees but work for temporary 
agencies.64 The warehouse industry is largely unorganized. 
A clinic team has been investigating work conditions at a mid-sized 
warehouse operation holding merchandise for major retailers, including Macy’s 
and Costco. Current and former workers approached WWRC seeking 
assistance. The workers alleged the following work conditions: 
• unsanitary and nonfunctioning bathrooms; 
• lack of safe drinking water; 
• unsafe operation of forklifts, including their use as ladders to retrieve 
heavy boxes from the tops of high shelves; 
• employees working seven days per week and as much as twelve hours 
per day, yet not receiving the premium pay allowed to them under 
state and federal law; 
• unreimbursed work time after workers have clocked out and use of 
their own vehicles to bring goods to shippers; 
• up to thirty minutes unpaid wait time each morning to clock in for 
work; 
• termination for refusing to comply with forced overtime, with women 
workers told that they should not have had children for which they 
were obligated to care; 
• lack of promotional opportunities for women, who were told that they 
were not qualified for higher paying jobs.65 
Like the clinic’s prior work with hotel industry workers in a series of 
cases,66 it appears that the bodies of low-wage immigrant workers are exploited 
for as much labor as managers can derive at the least cost.67 Sophisticated 
human resources programs that measure the productivity of individual workers 
in real-time are called “electronic whips” because of their use by managers to 
drive workers and to discipline and terminate them.68 Brands with hundreds of 
millions in revenue are undergirded by the nickel and diming of those lowest in 
the supply chain, not just in the United States but perhaps more brutally in the 
Asian countries where the warehoused goods are manufactured.69 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Memorandum from the UC Irvine IRC student team to file (Nov. 14, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
 66. See Sameer M. Ashar et al., Advancing Low-Wage Worker Organizing Through Legal 
Representation, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313 (2013). 
 67. See Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 68. See G. Stoney Alder, Ethical Issues in Electronic Performance Monitoring: A 
Consideration of Deontological and Teleological Perspectives, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 729, 735 (1998); 
Karen Levy, The Future of Work: What Isn’t Counted Counts, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/the-future-of-work-what-isnt-counted-counts 
[http://perma.cc/P494-AAT6]. 
 69. See, e.g., Jason Burke, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Leaves Trail of Shattered Lives, 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/bangladesh-factory-
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III. 
DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE BASES 
What do we make of these areas of work in the context of clinical legal 
education? Clinical practice generally corrects for deficiencies in legal 
education simply by putting students in the role as advocates for clients. First, 
there are the established and significant benefits of learning traditional legal 
techniques in a low-volume, highly supervised context.70 This occurs in any 
well-taught clinic in which students represent clients—civil or criminal, group 
or individual, big or small cases. Second, through clinic cases and projects, 
students come to understand—in the words of Elizabeth Mertz—the content of 
“conflict stories,” instead of focusing solely on the holdings of cases and 
corresponding legal authority.71 They develop facts and case theories rather 
than receiving them as given. 
Both the mandatory detention and warehouse labor projects offer the 
foundational benefits of in-house, live client clinical education. In the Adelanto 
project, students have a closely supervised in-court experience representing 
clients before immigration judges. They engage in fact investigation and 
development, legal research and writing, and client examination in court; 
defend against government cross-examination; and make closing arguments. 
Students also negotiate directly with ICE attorneys regarding the terms of bond 
releases. If the clinic secures the release of any detainees, such detainees’ 
chances of obtaining representation to fight the merits of their removal cases 
improve significantly. In the warehouse project, the clinic team has met with 
groups of workers at the office of our partner organization over multiple 
weekends. Law students have provided the workers with legal information 
while gathering facts to undergird potential legal action. They move from facts 
in casebooks to facts in life.72 
These projects have the potential to do even more pedagogical work in 
law schools. If we understand the work as cogenerative rather than extractive, 
we may develop student capacity in a few less developed and articulated areas 
of professional development, as set forth in the following Sections. These 
knowledge bases run contrary to both entrenched forms of doctrinal legal 
education, as well as the neoliberal reform approaches, in that they move away 
 
building-collapse-community [http://perma.cc/A59P-44KB]; Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In 
China, Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-
workers-in-china.html [http://perma.cc/MVA2-6TME]. 
 70. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 120–22. 
 71. Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist 
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 494–95 (2007). Mertz, in her linguistic study of the typical first 
year curriculum, concludes “[t]he move to focus on form, authority, and legal-linguistic contexts is 
thus accompanied by a shift away from precision or depth in discussions of content, morality, and 
social context.” Id. at 496. 
 72. See id. at 495. 
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from an individualistic, formal understanding of law to a more social, 
contextualized understanding.73 
A. Deep Critique 
Students have the opportunity to gain knowledge about social and 
economic structures from these projects. To fight to change the systems 
through which our clients are subordinated is an aspiration that runs across 
generations.74 This aspiration is one that we demonstrate in our approach to 
client representation and in the content of seminars and case discussions. It is 
perhaps demonstrated most emphatically in the intake rationale of clinicians,75 
which is often largely invisible to students. Gary Blasi said in 1994, 
“[s]tructuralist theories may not capture all that exists, but ignoring structure 
risks missing nearly everything.”76 
Clinics may attempt to develop structural analysis and methods of 
resistance to hegemonic oppression, but against a backdrop of disaggregation 
and relative disorganization. The historian Daniel Rogers argues: 
[I]n the last quarter of the century, through more and more domains of 
social thought and argument, the terms that had dominated post-World 
War II intellectual life began to fracture. One heard less about society, 
history, and power and more about individuals, contingency, and 
choice. The importance of economic institutions gave way to notions 
of flexible and instantly acting markets. History was said to accelerate 
into a multitude of almost instantaneously accessible possibilities. 
Identities became fluid and elective. Ideas of power thinned out and 
receded.77 
Disaggregation and neoliberalism are perfect and complementary bedfellows. 
If we cannot escape the box of our pervasive reality and of goods manufactured 
and assembled by workers in buildings surrounded by suicide nets,78 then even 
the location of such efforts within our particular social structure will undermine 
our efforts to resist it. The philosopher David Hoy brings this to the surface in 
Critical Resistance: “The general point is that utopian imaginings of freedom 
 
 73. Thanks to Rachel Moran for this insight. 
 74. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 355 (2008); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School 
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2004). 
 75. See Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Encouraging Reflection on and Involving Students in the 
Decision to Begin Representation, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 357 (2010); Jayashri Srikantiah & Jennifer 
Lee Koh, Teaching Individual Representation Alongside Institutional Advocacy: Pedagogical 
Implications of a Combined Advocacy Clinic, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 451 (2010). 
 76. Gary L. Blasi, What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1091 (1994); see Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach 
Contracts and What Socioeconomics Can Do About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55 (2004). 
 77. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 5 (2011); see Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, 
Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 697 (1992). 
 78. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 69. 
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may not be aware of the extent to which they presuppose the patterns of 
oppression that they are resisting.”79 
This is the field in which we operate, which requires us to develop in 
ourselves and in our students the capacity of deep critique, of thinking beneath 
and beyond liberal legalist approaches to social problems. We can develop this 
capacity only through collaborative work with people, communities, and 
thinkers at the margins of our social structure. The clinical standpoint, 
alongside our bond clients in immigration court, is significant. Our students 
gather “local knowledge,” in the words of Clifford Geertz,80 about the home 
communities from which our clients come, as well as how legal regimes bear 
down on them, even confining them in prisons or prison-like workplaces. We 
discover that power has reconfigured the land,81 so that people are dispossessed 
by law82 and made vulnerable to fractured systems of neoliberal production.83 
As we trace the expansion of the immigration enforcement system from the 
border to the interior, and the withdrawal of government from a mediating role 
in the employer-employee relationship, we unearth why things are the way they 
are. Both the mandatory detention and warehouse labor projects cause us to 
question the efficacy of quasi-adversarial systems in which power is decidedly 
tilted toward the state or powerful private interests.84 
However, the clinical standpoint is necessary but not sufficient. History 
and critical theory denaturalize the worlds our students confront through the 
practice of poverty law.85 History and theory give us the tools to engage in 
 
 79. DAVID COUZENS HOY, CRITICAL RESISTANCE: FROM POST-STRUCTURALISM TO POST-
CRITIQUE 3 (2004). Thanks to Nisha Agarwal and Jocelyn Simonson for introducing me to the work 
of David Hoy. See Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: 
Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455 (2010). 
 80. Mertz, supra note 71, at 486 n.6 (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 234 (3d ed. 2000)). 
 81. See Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor, 1 
DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1 (2012). 
 82. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Color and Colonialism: Racial Realism and Settler 
Colonial Theory, 11 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Andrea Smith, The Moral Limits of 
the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement, 2 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 69 
(2012). 
 83. See HARVEY, supra note 34, at 159 (“The main substantive achievement of 
neoliberalization, however, has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and income. I have 
elsewhere provided an account of the main mechanisms whereby this was achieved under the rubric of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ . . . . The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of 
legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes.”); DAVID WEIL, THE 
FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
IMPROVE IT (2014). 
 84. See Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra 
note 67, at 1, 19–20 (on the reflexive and undermining turn to legalism by left movements). 
 85. Margaret E. Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical 
Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161 (2005); see Helge Dedek, Stating Boundaries: 
The Law, Disciplined, in STATELESS LAW, supra note ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED., at 9, 21 
(“Yet the challenge levelled by ‘stateless law’ increases the pressure on the ‘discipline’ to leave the 
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campaigns, alongside community organizations and political activists, to 
change institutions of law. It is immensely difficult to maintain critical 
consciousness in the trenches of daily warfare with hostile or indifferent 
interests and with isolated clients. Organizers and other community actors 
bring consciousness almost necessarily lacking in the circumscribed 
relationship between lawyers and clients.86 Representing workers through 
WWRC causes us to ask whether we are changing conditions for workers 
across the industry through legal action. Organizers challenge us to 
acknowledge the limits of adjudication and provide a broader understanding of 
the possible scope of a grievance and the necessary social response. Racial 
subordination is both everywhere and nowhere in our work in immigration 
detention and in the warehouses of the Inland Empire.87 Collaboration with 
organizers encourages our students to develop both justiciable and non-
justiciable narratives in the course of our representation of detainees and 
workers.88 While critical and interdisciplinary perspectives can be explored in 
law school classes and seminars, they cannot replicate the experience of an 
immersive confrontation with an intractable social problem and close work 
with clients and organizers on that problem. 
B. Democratic Lawyering 
Legal academics have originated theories of lawyering rooted in clinical 
practice in waves of scholarship and program development. Gary Bellow co-
authored the Lawyering Process with Bea Moulton and developed the Legal 
 
trodden paths and become aware of the historically contingent factors that have come to define what 
we do.”). 
 86. See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword to LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 44, at xiii. 
 87. It is striking how little participants in the clinical enterprise discuss the dynamics of racial 
subordination in our legal practice. This may reflect the pull of color-blind ideologies within legal 
education. It remains difficult to discuss subordination in clinical conversations, perhaps in the absence 
of what Margaret Montoya calls the scaffolding of applied critical race theory in our pedagogy. 
Margaret E. Montoya, Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the 2010 Conference on Clinical Legal 
Education (May 6, 2010). Jean Koh Peters and Sue Bryant have done essential work in building a tool 
set for teaching cultural competence. Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the Habits: 
Teaching about Identity, Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF 
LAWYERS, supra note 48, at 349. We need to think together about how to carry this consciousness to 
clinical discussions about strategies and tactics that can be used against systems of social control and 
racial subordination. See Jean Koh Peters & Susan Bryant, Talking about Race, in TRANSFORMING 
THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 48, at 375. More than anything else, we need to exercise 
vigilance and courage as we construct a more relevant and meaningful anti-subordination pedagogy. 
 88. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Unsettling the Lawyers: Other Forms of Justice in 
Indigenous Claims of Expropriation, Abuse, and Injustice, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 620, 637 (2014) 
(“Conventionally trained lawyers and judges may be limited in how they conceive of legal claims and 
harms and be unable to enter into the subjective experience of those who experience harms and claims 
not yet recognized by formal legal systems.”). 
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Services Center with Jeanne Charn at Harvard.89 Tony Amsterdam developed a 
systemized method of teaching litigation skills from which came the Lawyering 
program at New York University School of Law.90 David Binder promoted an 
intense focus on discrete skill development and shaped the clinical program at 
UCLA School of Law to reflect this focus.91 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has 
argued that a principal strength of clinical legal education is its potential for 
theory generation, both about the substantive issues on which clinicians work 
with their students, as well as about lawyering.92 
Scholars in the first generation of clinical scholarship sought to elevate 
the work of their colleagues in clinics and to inspire the development of ideas 
and written work that might transform legal education and the profession. They 
demonstrated that access to experience outside of law school could lead to 
scholarship and teaching methodologies essential at both the micro-lawyering 
and macro-system levels. Although these scholars continue to maintain an 
unparalleled professional focus and record of social justice commitments and 
achievements, they made a concerted effort to demonstrate the usefulness of 
clinical teaching and scholarship across practice settings. They believed in the 
transfer value of clinical education for students entering areas of practice that 
might be quite different from the pro bono public interest practice of most 
clinics. Perhaps this is the reason why, in some of the key writings on 
lawyering theory, especially the work of Binder at UCLA, justice is sidelined 
to the periphery rather than centered, in contrast to the approach advocated by 
Robin West in her focus on doctrinal teaching.93 Clinical scholars demonstrated 
the value of their theories of lawyering and took great care to defend the 
enterprise against charges that it was insufficiently attentive to legal practice 
 
 89. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR 
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978). 
 90. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution and Legal Education, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1985, at 11 (Frank E. McArdle ed., 1987). 
 91. See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10 
CLINICAL L. REV. 191, 213–18 (2003) (encapsulating a skill-centered approach to clinical legal 
education). 
 92. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 
29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980). 
 93. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 43–61. But see Michael Meltsner, 
Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 (2003). On Bellow and Moulton’s 
effort to bridge generic skills acquisition with the moral commitments and responsibilities of a lawyer, 
Meltsner wrote: 
The Lawyering Process straddled this fence also. It includes “skill dimensions,” that 
encouraged clinicians to work on interviewing, counseling and negotiation as well as 
readings that raise painful questions of both personal and professional morality. You cannot 
work through its 1,121 pages without learning how to be a more effective practitioner 
regardless of who your client is; on the other hand, it would also take a pronounced sense of 
moral denial, one bordering on the morally inert, to avoid confronting in these pages the 
question of the proper use of the powers they impart. 
Id. at 347. 
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outside of public interest law.94 To be overly concerned with justice in clinical 
teaching and scholarship would be to relegate the new theories of lawyering to 
the concerns of the few at law schools and in professional settings across the 
United States.95 In this way, some of these works were responsive to the 
neoliberal consensus in the legal profession in the 1980s and 1990s,96 or 
interpreted as such to consolidate the neoliberal approach.97 
Scholars also generated writings on multiple variations of progressive 
lawyering with a more central justice focus. The works of Lucie White, Gerald 
Lopez, and others critiqued the ways in which poor people received legal 
services, as explored above in Part 0 of this Essay. Their affirmative visions of 
legal practice have yet to find widespread purchase in standard law school 
curricula. Ascanio Piomelli helpfully summarizes the collective aspirations that 
scholars developed in reaction to these critiques in his description of 
democratic lawyering. Democratic lawyering, according to Piomelli, is when 
we “regularly work with people and groups involved in struggles for dignity, 
survival, self-determination, and other basic human needs” and “seek to foster 
and join collective efforts of low-income and working-class people and people 
of color to reshape their own lives and communities,” “in short, to form and 
support active publics—groups that come together to understand, confront, and 
attempt to gain some control over the forces and actors shaping their lives.”98 
The idea of “active publics” is essential.99 Daniel Fischlin, Ajay Heble, and 
George Lipsitz argue, “[w]ithout concrete, self-active constituencies deciding 
democratically the contours of acceptable human conduct, human rights can 
 
 94. See Binder & Bergman, supra note 91, at 302–03 (“Clinicians routinely lament the 
tendency of non-clinical law school faculty and administrators to perceive clinicians as ‘second class 
citizens.’ Yet the survey-type coverage to which the case-centered approach relegates lawyering skills 
may contribute to this unwelcome attitude.”). 
 95. See Kennedy, supra note 17. 
 96. See Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 19 (2014). 
 97. Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that the effort to classify and mainstream clinical 
methods through the “MacCrate Report,” AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (1992), may have unintentionally undermined the social justice foundation of 
clinical legal education. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Comments at the Contemporary Perspectives on 
Professional Education Session at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (May 30, 2015); 
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the 
MacCrate Report—Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 622 
(1994) (arguing for the teaching of “ethical consequentialism” in law schools, so as to incorporate 
conceptions of the public good); see also Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 
21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REV. 573 (1994) (arguing for greater attention in legal education to 
curtailment of legal services for the poor and accelerating economic inequality). 
 98. Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 
1394 (2009). 
 99. See id. 
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become a . . . discourse that regulates human suffering rather than prevents 
it.”100 
Practitioners who seek to resist participating in the regulation of human 
suffering approach the work of lawyering by elevating methodological 
commitments over substantive or tactical ones. Collaborators ask them to 
employ a range of legal and political advocacy tactics with a range of social 
justice ends defined in conjunction with them.101 Lawyers are not mere 
conduits for clients’ justice aspirations with no politics of their own. Lawyers 
always bring politics to their relationships with clients, even if the approach is 
ostensibly apolitical.102 Practitioners aspire to co-construct legal projects and 
social justice goals with activated groups of clients. Piomelli concisely 
describes the work: “Democratic lawyers collaborate with and nurture 
grassroots groups in which everyday people participate in multiple realms of 
self-rule or self-government, including tactical and strategic deliberation, 
public and behind-the-scenes leadership, joint public action, and joint 
assessment of that action.”103 Sophisticated public interest lawyers consider 
competing structures of collaboration with active publics.104 In contrast, Mertz 
describes a curriculum that teaches law students to pick up any situation and 
efficiently translate it into set legal categories.105 
“Constrained legalism”106 and “tactical pluralism,”107 both terms defined 
by Scott Cummings to describe the significant strategic features of the 
collaborative relationships between lawyers and community groups, require 
that legal teams assess the efficacy of legal action to accomplish goals set by 
client groups. The slide into legalism is stayed, as students learn to understand 
client goals and assess legal action as a means toward those goals, alongside a 
range of other advocacy methods. We feel this acutely in the warehouse case, 
in which we are poised to begin litigation, even without a larger understanding 
of how such legal action might fit into the broader goal of industry 
transformation. The ultimate aim is usually not the winning of a case or 
 
 100. DANIEL FISCHLIN ET AL., THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW: IMPROVISATION, RIGHTS, AND 
THE ETHICS OF COCREATION xviii (2013). 
 101. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1879 (2007) (describing collaborative legal and organizing campaign on behalf of 
restaurant workers). 
 102. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 297 (1996). 
 103. Piomelli, supra note 98, at 1391. 
 104. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and 
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 
(1992); Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 25 (2011). 
 105. Mertz, supra note 71, at 508. 
 106. Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
62, 67–71 (2007). 
 107. Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study 
of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1932 (2007). 
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passage of a bill, but instead something headier and less clear, such as the 
development of collective power. The open-ended nature of the search for legal 
mechanisms by which to repair harms identified by communities speaks to the 
larger pedagogical goal of preparing students to engage, in the words of Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, in “process pluralism,” particularly in response to difficult 
historically and macro-politically entrenched problems.108 The tension between 
social justice goals and legal means is not inherent. It is a product of the path 
development of legal practice in which every dispute is characterized and 
defined as one between individuals or between individuals and the state. The 
law and organizing109 and cause lawyering110 literatures contest the shape of 
current legal practice, and the actors in those narratives push at the boundaries 
of legal practice as defined by the rules of ethical conduct and the less formal 
conventions of local practice. 
To be sure, the development of tactical and strategic analysis is possible 
in individual client clinics with no relation to a broader social vision. However, 
faculty will often add cases and projects to the docket because of the certainty 
of the need for legal action, as determined by the supervisor or the client, rather 
than the desire to solve a social problem, as defined collaboratively by lawyers 
and clients. 
In addition to the ability to assess the need for legal action, democratic 
lawyers learn to collaborate with and nurture partners from the community, 
mediate complex decision making within organizations and communities,111 
frame social problems, and think carefully about power—how it is created, 
distributed, used, and lost. Students move out of legal systems with 
predetermined assignments of authority, in which poor people must plaintively 
submit to judges and prosecutors possessing enormous power over their lives. 
They are forced to think creatively and irreverently about reallocating power in 
specific circumstances. They engage with clients who are collaborating with 
others and, in some cases, with sophisticated political organizers. “Affective 
solidarity” with groups of clients keeps lawyers involved in community, no 
matter what type of practice they enter upon graduation.112 Appreciating the 
plasticity of legal roles preserves motivation and works against individualistic 
and formalistic assumptions in mainstream professional socialization.113 
 
 108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 88. 
 109. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001). 
 110. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004). 
 111. See Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and 
Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469, 473 (discussing what lawyers can do to 
make sure democratic “community-building” is real, not ritualized). 
 112. Piomelli, supra note 98, at 1393. 
 113. See id. at 1397–1408; Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1084–85 (“Although the depth of lawyer 
bias and the force of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collaboratively 
enlarging the scope of client participation in the ‘lawyering’ process through individual decision-
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Democratic lawyering deepens critique, both of formalistic lawyering roles and 
of entrenched arrangements of power and resources in society.114 
IV. 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Rather than inviting disruption and displacement,115 law schools presently 
have the capacity to rediscover their purpose, reinvent their programs of study, 
and activate students in joint learning and engagement with active publics. 
Vexing “ill-structured” social problems116 ought to serve as the core vehicles 
through which students learn about law and lawyering.117 Clinics are the 
institutional mechanism through which this work comes into the four walls of 
the law school. Clinics also carefully facilitate the presence of students and 
faculty in law offices, basements, restaurant meeting rooms, church halls, and 
other spaces outside of the university. Clinical practice with an expansive 
social vision is central to thick legal education reform proposals that do not 
hew to the current needs of private employers or austerity-era public entities. 
Legal education, through clinics, has an essential role in generating new visions 
of practice and undergirding the moral and ethical responsibilities of the 
profession.118 
A. Centering Clinical Legal Education 
The marginalization of clinics in discussions about legal education reform 
is surprising until one understands the underlying assumptions and constructs. 
To justify significant deregulation, differentiated legal education, shortened 
programs, a return to an apprentice or externship model, and deputization of 
students to provide individual legal services, one must do so in the name of 
 
making and collective action transforms practical judgment.”); Bennett, supra note 111, at 495–96 
(“There is nothing static about any of the on-going, long-term relationships between actors engaged in 
creating strong institutions for their communities; the lawyer-client bond is just one of those many 
relationships. The community-based lawyer should anticipate reciprocating her client’s evolution.”). 
 114. Amna Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.L. EDUC. 352 
(2015) (describing the ways in which the Black Lives Matter movement should be understood within 
legal education). 
 115. Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, NEW 
YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine 
[http://perma.cc/Y3YG-X9Y3]. 
 116. Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community Economic 
Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002). 
 117. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical 
Education as Methodology, in THE COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INC., 
CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (1973); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in 
Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 591 (1987) (“Under 
Bellow’s definition of clinical education there is nothing inherently limiting about clinical education 
other than using the student’s performance as a starting point for inquiry.”). 
 118. See Moran, supra note 8, at 17 (“Imagine a clinical program that recognized society’s need 
for lawyers with social justice perspectives as well as the importance of preparing students for their 
role as citizen-lawyers.”). 
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practice-readiness. Clinical legal education complicates that simple story. 
Rather than think critically about how to more effectively integrate clinical 
education into the overall law school curriculum or how to have students work 
on more complex matters in clinical settings, neoliberal reformers write off 
clinical education as “expensive”119 and “artificial,”120 with second-class 
clinicians cast as rent-seekers.121 These critics need to sideline clinical 
education because it interferes with what is fundamentally a neoliberal 
approach to legal education: market differentiation, commodification, and 
students understood first as consumers and then as laboring cogs in law offices. 
That students might learn about lawyering and the profession in non-market 
spaces within the university setting appears intolerable. This is shortsighted and 
revealing, as it exposes the background ideology that shapes the reform 
discussion. 
Robert Kuehn has deftly picked apart the assumption that increased 
opportunities for student participation in clinics would increase law school 
tuition.122 Kuehn reports the many causes of increased tuition: prioritizing 
scholarship production of non-clinical faculty through lower teaching loads and 
higher salaries; merit-based grants and aid in the ranking-driven competition 
for students with high numerical entrance indicators; new construction of law 
school buildings; higher administrative and support service costs; and required 
payments by law schools to their universities.123 When schools need to make 
cuts, as has been the case at most law schools since the 2008 economic crisis, 
many fixate on the costs of clinical education.124 In fact, according to Kuehn’s 
analysis of available data, 84 percent of law schools have the opportunity to 
offer a clinical experience to every student without an increase in tuition.125 
This dissonance appears to reflect a set of values about what is institutionally 
necessary, as well as a reflexive attempt to protect the accumulated privilege 
(and rent-seeking) embedded in the entrenched system of legal education. This 
understanding may not quickly enable deans at the 82 percent of law schools 
that do not guarantee clinical education126 to expand experiential offerings. But 
it is essential that there be a degree of honesty about the range of costs borne by 
 
 119. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 172–73 (pointing out that clinical education is 
uneconomical, not a solution to legal education’s long-term woes); Drew & Morriss, supra note 30, 
manuscript at 4 (clinics are “more expensive on a per student-credit-hour basis than doctrinal 
courses”); Henderson, supra note 37, at 502. 
 120. TAMANAHA, supra note 32, at 173 (“Law schools, at great expense, create artificial 
practice settings within an academic institution although actual settings exist in the world of legal 
practice. The economic inefficiency of this arrangement places an upper limit on the expansion of 
clinics . . . .”). 
 121. Drew & Morriss, supra note 30, manuscript at 11. 
 122. Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 123. Id. at 7–10. 
 124. Id. at 12. 
 125. Id. at 32–39. 
 126. Id. at 32–33 (“[O]nly 18% of law schools (36 of 202) presently require or guarantee a 
clinical experience.”). 
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students through their tuition. Many law schools have (again, reflexively) 
prioritized faculty salaries, new buildings, and higher position in the rankings 
over experiential education and community engagement. 
More surprising than the cost fixation of neoliberal reformers, however, is 
the apparent disregard of clinical practice by progressive reformers.127 Robin 
West devotes a chapter of her otherwise deeply insightful book on the 
existential crisis facing legal education to a discussion of how bifurcated 
faculties of interdisciplinary scholars and clinicians prevent law students from 
engaging in normative analysis of the law, critical theory, legalism, and legal 
policy formulation for entrenched social problems.128 These misimpressions on 
the part of a critical doctrinal scholar at a prominent law school with a rich, 
varied, and expansive clinical program129 indicate that the (at times) externally 
imposed and (at other times) internally sought isolation (or insulation) of 
clinical law teachers must end. Here again we see evidence of accumulated 
privilege and institutional inertia at work. To draw out the greatest synergies 
with other coursework and the overall intellectual activity at a law school, 
clinical teachers must be fully integrated in faculties and in governance. And 
yet, particularly at higher-ranked schools, there is either a cognitive disconnect 
or some degree of existential angst associated with creating parity across 
faculties, including clinicians, legal writing teachers, and academic support 
specialists. Colleagues in those sectors of the faculty are deemed marginal 
because they lack scholarly productivity while they are often discouraged by 
institutions from allocating time for intellectual pursuits over the direct 
instruction of students. It is also sometimes true that individuals in those 
categories embrace their marginality in exchange for autonomy and more 
intense focus on direct student instruction (and, in the case of clinicians, client 
services). Faculties must either develop more complex and inclusive criteria in 
crediting institutional contributions (perhaps leading to a reconfigured 
understanding of institutional worth) or provide colleagues in those marginal 
sectors with time, resources, and perhaps the affirmative expectation that they 
will engage in scholarly exchange, adjusted for the obligations owed by 
clinicians to their clients. 
While clinical legal education ought not to be the sole carrier of justice 
concerns in U.S. law schools, it is essential that a progressive reform agenda be 
 
 127. But see Stephanie Dangel & Michael J. Madison, Innovators, Esq.: Training the Next 
Generation of Lawyer Social Entrepreneurs, 83 UMKC L. REV. 967 (2015); Martha F. Davis, 
Institutionalizing Legal Innovation: The (Re)Emergence of the Law Lab, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190 
(2015). These authors use the modern language of innovation and entrepreneurship rather than 
collectivist conceptions of social justice, but do so to advocate for law school focus on wide-ranging 
social problems. See also Deborah J. Merritt, Student Choice, L. SCH. CAFE (Aug. 13, 2015, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/student-choice [http://perma.cc/7C6X-Q9YZ] (supporting 
California State Bar proposal to require fifteen experiential credits). 
 128. WEST, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 131–73. 
 129. As outlined in Part 0 of this Essay, supra, clinical legal education is complex—as complex 
as the public interest legal ecosystem of which it is a part. 
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centered on the sites of actual legal practice with marginalized people. This 
also renews the commitment to social justice within clinical legal education, 
even as it is tested by institutional and generational shifts. 
B. Critical Systems Analysis 
Lawyers do not possess the narratives that communities generate. 
Lawyers are taught at an early point in their education to exercise detachment 
and to assess factual stories without the benefit of preexisting moral or 
communitarian commitments.130 Many law students experience this feature of 
the curriculum as both energizing, because of the obvious disjuncture with their 
previous lives, and depressing and disaggregating, for precisely the same 
reason. Many law students are still in the midst of identity formation and 
commitment definition when they arrive at law school. As law skeletonizes 
facts to facilitate adjudication,131 it categorizes and reduces complex and 
contradictory human experience.132 By bringing groups of clients into clinical 
practice and giving students critical frames generated across disciplines, we 
encourage them to put their newfound skills of categorization and reduction 
into a broader, structural context. The goal is to give them the experience 
necessary to interpret community narratives and to co-construct social 
problems and potential legal responses, alongside clients.133 For some, this kind 
of clinical practice may be the way “back in,” as Christine Zuni Cruz has 
termed it,134 to reconnect students with communities,135 strengthened by adding 
legal skills to their professional repertoire. 
Are we truly able to get outside of the social structure in which we are 
located to develop new means to resist the forces grinding down the minds and 
bodies of our clients? Is our critique deep enough? Not yet, for sure. But this is 
a knowledge base—a struggle of thought and imagination, really—that merits 
our full attention. Our students are learning about intersecting systems of legal 
 
 130. See Mertz, supra note 71. 
 131. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 170 (3d ed. 2000). 
 132. It is important to acknowledge that this, too, is “experiential education.” JOHN DEWEY, 
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE 26 (1938) (“It is a great mistake to suppose, even tacitly, that the 
traditional schoolroom was not a place in which pupils had experiences.”). 
 133. See Bellow, supra note 102; Bennett, supra note 111, at 495 (“Made explicit, the 
happenstance interchanges between client and lawyer can be transformed into a ‘learning loop’ that 
resembles the function performed by the ‘learning community.’”). One outstanding question is 
whether the limited contacts that may occur between lawyers and poor clients are characterized by 
honest and critical evaluation of legal and life options and with the values of each party at the surface 
of the communication. See STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2009). 
 134. Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous 
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999). 
 135. Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1083 (“A transformative commitment to difference-based 
identity and antisubordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims in 
rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation.”). 
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power, such as the immigration and criminal justice systems. So many are 
mandatorily confined at the Adelanto facility due to over-policing in 
communities of color and vague and expansive gang injunctions borne of a 
race-based war on drugs. Our students become keenly aware of the flaws in the 
criminal justice system through immigration bond representation. Our students 
are also deeply conscious of the fact that a profit-seeking, publicly traded 
corporation operates the detention facility in close collusion with the state. Are 
we engaged in critical resistance? Again, not yet. But in this work are the seeds 
of pedagogical goals and methods that have the potential to transform the 
relationship between the profession and the social problems that directly 
implicate law, as taught in U.S. law schools.136 
The projects described in this Essay, the types of critiques referenced—
against exploitative employers and an over-criminalizing state—as well as the 
terminology used (“progressive” versus “neoliberal”) appear to indicate strong 
political bias, which in turn may be used to argue against a clinic-centered 
program of legal education reform. Opponents such as Eric Posner use the left-
leaning projects of human rights clinics to argue against the existence of those 
clinics.137 Drew and Morriss indicate a preference for individual service 
provision over larger advocacy projects in clinics. This posture is reminiscent 
of the attacks on the Legal Services Corporation waged by conservative 
opponents over many years, which succeeded in eliminating the capacity of 
those lawyers to engage in class action litigation and to represent 
undocumented immigrants.138 These strategies of delegitimization are well-
worn and themselves evidence of entrenched political bias. By trimming the 
sails of law school clinics, opponents (and path-dependent proponents) avoid 
even minor disturbances in the distribution of power and resources in the 
United States through law or legal action. Rather than taking out the adversary 
by grounding critiques in unsupported arguments about pedagogy or relative 
expense, opponents should speak directly as to why they believe these issues 
and problems ought not to be a part of the law school curriculum. Why 
shouldn’t we study the failure of state regulation in the market for globalized 
low-wage labor? Or the inefficiency of immigrant detention and the rent 
seeking of private prison companies? Unfortunately, the charge of political bias 
in educational contexts is often an attempt to hide opposing political bias and to 
preserve the status quo. 
The less contentious response to the charge of political bias is simply that 
clinics with social vision may be guided by a diverse set of values and 
 
 136. But see Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons: Seven 
Theses, 22 SOC. TEXT 101 (2004) (arguing that critical academic projects reinforce the university as a 
pillar of state power over subjugated peoples). 
 137. See Posner, supra note 31. 
 138. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 220–26 (2003). 
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methods. There is no single kind of clinic that would generate deep critique and 
an understanding of democratic lawyering among students. Criminal defender 
clinics provide individual services and often provoke deep thinking among 
students about the criminal justice system and mass incarceration.139 Clinics 
focused on a geographic community or neighborhood may deploy a range of 
lawyering methods, including individual case representation, to challenge 
unjust conditions of life in those areas.140 A clinic focused on religious liberty 
may be cast as politically conservative,141 but in fact represents poor and 
working class clients and engages in the kind of multi-modal advocacy and 
engagement with social movements and ideas described in Part II of this 
Essay.142 It is true that the struggles of people who cannot afford to pay for 
legal services are often against a bureaucratic state or exploitative private 
actors. Lawyers need to be free to use all possible means to challenge the 
difficult conditions of their clients’ lives. Many clinics do promote a vision of 
the public good. To say that this is out of bounds within legal education is to 
deny one of the foundational precepts of the legal profession.143 
C. Theories of Lawyering Across Paradigms of Practice 
The work described above requires adaptability, improvisation, and 
invention.144 In their critique of the architecture profession in Spatial Agency, 
Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till resonate deeply: 
Professions rely on this assertion of stable knowledge in order to give 
themselves authority over others, and so to accept acting otherwise is 
to recognise the limits of one’s authority, and to relinquish the sole 
hold of fixed and certain knowledge. If agents are indeed to allow 
themselves to act otherwise, then the knowledge that they bring to the 
table must be negotiable, flexible and, above all, shared with others.145 
These attributes—adaptability, improvisation, and invention—mirror the 
skillset identified by the legal academic analysts of a changing private sector 
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market for legal services, such as William Henderson and David Wilkins.146 In 
the case of producing goods and providing services across borders, Henderson 
discusses “process engineering” and the need for law graduates to understand 
how to generate competent legal work product from disaggregated systems and 
supply chains.147 In the case of redress for systematic elimination of indigenous 
culture and community in Canada, Menkel-Meadow discusses “process 
pluralism” and the need for lawyers to be able to formulate differing kinds of 
dispute resolution mechanisms for variable and dynamic problems.148 In either 
case, society (and future employers) demand that legal education provide law 
students with ill-structured problems and give them the space and guidance to 
wrestle with those problems. While ill-structured problems with high degrees 
of uncertainty can be found in all sectors, local manifestations of massive and 
intractable problems, such as poverty, racism, and exploitation offer a great 
deal of space for law students to gain experience in process design, particularly 
when they represent groups of activated community members.149 As work is 
outsourced to different kinds of legal service providers, leading lawyers must 
develop strategic and tactical sophistication. As work moves across borders, 
leading lawyers must build relationships and collaborate effectively. These 
attributes are significantly present in clinical work advanced on the tenets of 
democratic lawyering. 
Another favorite theme of the market-based legal education reformers is 
technological change and the likely displacement of humans in providing 
certain kinds of legal services. However, it is important to refrain from over-
determining outcomes of expanded technological capacity, as Frank Pasquale 
and Glyn Cashwell argue: “[L]egal and cultural change can render once 
contestable disputes essentially automatable, and can also render once 
automatically resolved disputes open to new levels of contestation.”150 Law 
schools, through scholarship and clinical practice, have an essential role to play 
in helping society draw lines between automation and discretion in legal 
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decision making. Clinics, especially, have a key role in bringing active publics 
to the table as elected officials, judges, and administrators make these 
decisions. 
We seek above all to cultivate in students and in ourselves the capacity for 
action. Difficult social problems and unjust conditions of life invite analysis 
and action. These problems and conditions need a place to land within legal 
education. This, in turn, makes legal education essential in society and 
motivates young people to become lawyers.151 
CONCLUSION 
Instability creates space for experimentation and the possibility of 
desubjectification or desubjugation. In David Hoy’s words, “[c]ritique does not 
tell people who they really are and what they ought to do. Instead, . . . critique 
challenges their understanding of who they are, and it leads them to resist their 
attachment to their social identities and ideals.”152 It may not feel apparent, but 
law schools possess a degree of institutional flexibility relative to 
nongovernmental organizations and legal services entities. Further, legal 
educators have the capacity to break down subject matter silos within our 
institutions and across the university. Because of the educational mission of 
law schools, there is a degree of tolerance for the inefficiency of critique and 
democratic resistance, essential in this course of experimentation. 
Institutionally, law schools have the potential to flourish by resisting extractive, 
neoliberal approaches and centering social problems as the core content of 
learning agendas and active publics as collaborative partners. Through this 
cogenerative work with those at the margins, we can gain the capacity to 
envision new forms of legal practice, grounded in the profession’s justice-
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